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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit = Won (W)
Average used in Appraisal Estimates (June 1985): US$1.00 W 816
Actual yearly average market values: 1/
US$1.00 = W 870 (1985 average)
= W 881 (1986 average)
= W 823 (1987 average)
= W 731 (1988 average)
= W 671 (1989 average)
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 to December 31
WEIGHCTS AND MEASURES
m = meter = 3.28 feet
km = kilometer = 0.62 miles
sq km = square kilometer = 0.39 square miles
cu m = cubic meter = 264 US gallons of water
= 1.0 metric ton of water
cu mid = cubic meters per day
1 = liter = 0.26 US gallons
mt = metric ton = 2,205 pounds
= 1.0 cubic meters of water
mt/d = metric ton per day
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ADB = Asian Development Bank
ERR = Economic rate of return
ICB = International competitive bidding
IFRR = Incremental financial rate of return
ISWACO = Industrial Sites and Water Resources Development Corp.
KOWACO = Korea Water Resources Corp. (replaced ISWACO in 1988 as
agency responsible for water resource development and
management).
MOC = Ministry of Construction
MOF = Minist.-y of Finance
MOHA = Ministry of Home Affairs
NRS = Namgang Regional Water System
OSROK = Office of Supply, Republic of Korea
RCMA = Regional Construction and Management Agency of MOC
TWB = Taegu City Water Bureau
TWS = Taegu Water System
TWSB = Taegu Water Supply and Sewerage Bureau
WB = Water Bureau
1/ Average market (rf) values from "International Financial Statistics",
published by the International Monetary fund.
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
NAMGANG AND TAEGU WATER SUPPLY PROJECT
(LOAN 2615-KO)
PREFACE
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Namgang and
taegu Water Supply Project in Korea, for which Loan 2615-KO in the amount of
US$36.0 million to the Republic of Korea was approved on August 27, 1965.
This was the fourth Korean project exclusively for community water supply
financed by the Bank (Part III, Section 1).
The project had two components. One was for the Namgang Regional
Water System, for which US$15.0 million of the loan was allo! ..ed. The other
was for the Taegu Water System, for which US$23.0 million of the loan was
relent to the City of Taegu under a Subsidiary Loan Agreement.
During project implementation, US$3.67 million of the loan amount
was canceled at the request of the Borrower. The loan was closed on schedule
on June 30, 1990 and the undisbursed balance of US$0.12 million was canceled
on July 2, 1990. The final disbursed amount was US$34.01 million.
Complimentary distribution networks in the two main project cities
of the Namgang Regional Water System were part of an entirely separate project
financed through a loan by the Asian Development Bank. Distribution
facilities for the other communities to be served by the Namgang System were
financed from funds made available through the Ministry of Home Affairs.
The PCR has been prepared jointly by the Infrastructure Operations
Division of the Asia Regional Office (Preface, Evaluation Summary and Parts I
and III) and the Ministry of Construction and Taegu City's Water Supply Agency
which contributeu. the information for Part II.
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The Project and Its Objectives
i. The project was the fourth in a line of Bank financed Korean
projects-exclusively for community water supplies, all the result of the
increased priority being given by the Government since the late 1970's to
upgrading and expanding water services in water-scarce regions and urban areaL
and to make better use of limited national water resources (Part I, paras. I
and 2; Part III, Section 1).
ii. The project consisted of two water supply components: the Namgang
Regional Water System (NRS) component to serve communities in Kyeongnam
Province; and the Taegu Water System (TWS) component for Taegu City. Annex I
is the description of the project as given in Schedule 2 of the Loan
Agreement. As a whole, the project was expected to imp;ove water services to
about two million people and provide public water service for the first time
to about 520,000 additional persons by 1991 (Part I, paras. 7 and 9; Annex 1).
iii. The objectives of the NRS component were to provide adequate and
reliable treated water to 13 cities, towns and villages, 9 of which had no
public water service, located in a poor area of the country where water
shortages had been a major hindrance to development and the cause of serious
conflicts between municipalities over the use of limited ground water
resources (Part I, para. 7). Complimentary distribution networks in the two
main project cities of the NRS were part of an entirely separare project
financed through a loan by the Asian Development Bank. Distribution
facilities for the other communities to be served by the NRS were financrd
from funds made available through the Ministry of Home Affairs.
iv. The TWS component was intended to increase water supply coverage
in Taegu, ensure adequate water service particularly to the low-income
population, reduce unaccounted-for water from about 40% of production to about
30% by 1990 and improve the organization of water supply and sewer services in
Targu. Other project objectives were to extend the scope of a national bulk
wat?r tariff study to include the NRS, and generally to promote sector
development through expanded dialogue with the Government (Part 1, para.8).
v. While generally conventional, the project included some important
features which were innovative for Korea: the treatment of water before
distribution in bulk to the communities served by the NRS; and the objective
of combining the water supply and sewerage service operations in Taegu. The
project was expected to be completed by December 31, 1968 at a total cost,
based on June 1985 prices, of W 84.5 billion, or US$ 103.7 million equivalent
(Part I, paras. 5, 9 and 13).
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Implementation Experience
i. Appraisal, negotiations and Board approval of the loan (in August,
L985) took place about five months ahead of the Bank's timetable for the
project. The loan became effective two months after loan approval. By the
time the loan was approved, the project was in an advanced stage of
preparation. General Pro'.urerment Noticez had been advertised, pre-
qualification of contractors for civ.l works had been carried out, detailed
design was substantially completed, and some contracts had been bid and were
ready for award (Part I, paras. 6, 16 and 19; Part III, Section 2a).
vii. Designs, proc'irement procedures, project management and
construction quality were very good for both project components. The TWS
component was completed on schedule. Implementation of the NRS component "as
marred by planning errors. Land acquisition problems, which should have been
resolved at the planning stage, required relocation and redesign of the water
treatment plant and portions of the transmission mains. A belated decision by
the Water Resources Bureau of the Ministry of Construction (MDC) to consider
raising the level of the existing dam, caused a long delay in setting the
elevation of the water intake. The possibility of such a cnange had not been
brought up when the project was prepared and appraised due to poor
coordination between government agencies. These problems were the principal
cause of delay of final completion of the NRS component by about 21 months
(Part I, paras. 16, 17 and 20-23; Part II, paras. 1.5-1.7).
viii. Procurement went smoothly. Although all contracts for supply of
goods and all major construction contracts were open for international
competition, there was limited interest by foreign firms and few were
successful in winning contracts. This is attributsd to the competitiveness of
Korean firms and the local availability and good quality of most goods and
services required for the project (Part I, paras. 22-24).
ix. The reported total actual cost of the project was W 66,400 million
(US$84.3 million equivalent), or about 78% of the appraisal estimates when
expressed in won and about 81% when expressed in US$. For the NRS component,
the actual costs were about 84% of the appraisal estimates when expressed in
won, or about 89%, expressed in USS. For the TWS component, the reported
total actual costs were about 75% of the estimates when expressed in won, or
about 77, expressed in US$ (Part I, paras. 25-30; Part III, Section Sa).
x. Because of the low level of involvement by foreign contractors and
suppliers, direct foreign exchange expenditures on the project were
unexpectedly low at only about 6% of total costs and indirect foreign exchange
costs for imported inputs for local goods used in the project probably were
higher than estimated at appraisal (Part I, paras. 26, 27 and 34; Part III,
Section 5a).
xi. Project cost savings resulted from a number of factors,
principally: the very active local competition for contracts; good contract
documents, procurement procedures and project management; and a very low and
unexpected level of reliance on imported goods. The appraisal estimates were
based on actual MOC experience with Japanese contractors and suppliers winning
most contracts and could not anticipate the tremendous development of Korean
industry and its efficiency during the implementation period (Part I, paras.
26 and 34; Part III, Section Sa).
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Project Results
xii. The project can be expected to meet substantially all of the
physical objectives by 1995, although improvements resulting from the NRS
component started about one year late. By 1995 about 950,000 additional
persons should have public water service, of which about 90,000 had not
previously had access to any public water service prior to the project, and
the total population served by the two water supply systems should be close to
3.4 million. In addition, unaccounted-for, or non-revenue water in Taegu had
been reduced from about 38% of production in 1984 to about 29% in 1990, which
was better than the project objective and an excellent example of a successful
loss reduction program (Part 1, para 37; Part III, Section 6a).
xiii. The financial results of the project were less satisfactory. A
government freeze on tariff increases - part of a price stabilization policy -
blocked efforts to raise tariffs necessary to achieve satisfactory levels of
performance bv both water supply avencies as specified in the loan agreement.
The Taegu City Water Bureau (TWB) appears to have managed the tariff
constraint problem bitter then the Korea Water Resc.z-~-es Corporation (KOWAC0),
the agency responsible for NRS operations, by keeping its operating *xpenses
under control (Part I, paras. 38 and 39: Part III, Section 6c).
xiv. Considering the financial results, the economic results were
reasonably good. The recalculated incremental financial rates of return
(IFRR) for the two systems (about dX/. frr Namgang and about 16% for Taequ) are
substdntially the same or only slightly lower than the appraisal estimates.
It is clear that the recalculated returns benefitted considerably from the
reductions in project costs. Also, continuation of r2strict.ons on tariff
increases, together with increasing operating expenses, could easily result in
a negative IFRR for the NRS component. In this case, however, the economic
rate of return (ERR), rather than the IFRR, is a better basis for evaluation,
and while the ERR has not been recalculated, there is nothing to indicate that
it would be significantly different from the 6% calculated during appraisal
(Part 1, paras. 40-42; Part III, Section 6b).
xv. The project's success in meeting the objective of improving the
combined efficiency of Taegu's water supply and sew.erage services was limited.
Bank insistence on the need for reorganization of the services did help to
promote policy discussions and analyses of possible sector organizatinns at
the national level, however, and for a few years during project implementation
the Taegu water and sewerage services had the same director. But in 1990,
there was a major reorganization of the water supply sector and Taegu's water
and sewerage services were separated again. Nevertheless, the 1990
reorganization could lead to sewerage services becoming self-financing and
becoming part of the newly established water supply corporations (Part 1,
paras. 43-45).
Sustainability
xvi. The major recognizable risk to the project's achievement and
enhancement of its potential benefits is continuation of the Government's
resistance to allowing the water supply agencies to set tariffs and other
charges at necessary levels. Another risk.is that continued delay in
acquiring land necessary for optimum operation of the NRS reservoir could
limit the systems capacity to meet future demands (Part 1, para. 46).
vFindings and Lessons Learned
xvil. This was a very successful project by aoy standard. It was well
conceived and timely and the benefits upon completion are high. Preparation
and loan effectiveness were accomplished in record times. Designs were
excellent. The project was carried out economically, substantially below the
estimated costs and, except for the problems which hampered the Namgang
component, implementation was efficient.
xviii. The principal lessons emerging from the project experience are:
a) thorough project preparation by an efficient and technically
qualified implementing agency can lead to a very successful
project, but, as in the case of the Namgang component, failure to
make thorough pre-design investigations or to make timely
decisions, can cause avoidable delays (Part I, para. 17; Part II,
paras. 1.6-1.9);
b) we'l designed contract documents, quick and efficient procurement
procedures and good tight project management can keep proje:t
costs under control by reducing delays, changes, disputes,
misunderstandings and contractor claims for extra compensation
(Part I, para. 25);
c) cooperative, understanding and receptive attitudes by staff on
both sides - the executing agencies and the Bank - can result in
efficient communication and quick resolution of most differences
which can arise during project preparation and implementation
(Part I, paras. 48-49; Part II, para. 5.2);
d) determination and efficiency in applying leak detection technology
and applying other measures for reducing unaccounted-for or non-
revenue water can be very successful even in a large system
containing significant amounts of old distribution pipelines
(Part I, paras. 8 and 37; Part II, para 101);
e) appraisal teams on any project which might conflict with the
interests of other government agencies, or other parts of the
implementing agency, should assure that other development plans or
activities are unlikely to disrupt implementation of the proposed
project (Part I, p2. 1. 17; Part II, paras. 1.8, 2.2 and 2.4);
f) Bank supervision missions should carefully review all project
cost, forecasting and reporting procedures to assure that there is
a clear understanding of how the records should be kept and
reported for Bank purposes (Part I, para. 52); and
g) if internal financial or economic rates of return are to be
recalculated upon project completion, then it is essential for
Bank staff to assure that up-to-date records of the necessary
inputs are maintained and available for the Bank when the project
is completed (Part I, paras. 40-42, Part III, Section 6b).
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PART I PROJECT EVsIEW FROM BANY'S PESPECTIVE
Project Identity
Project Name: Namgang and Taegu Water Supply Project
Loan Number: 2615-KO
RVP Unit: Asia Regional Office
Country: Republic of Korea
Borrower: Republic of Korea
Sector: Water Supply
Background
1. Sector Development Objectives. Korea, with one of the world's
highe6t population densities (410 persons/sq km in 1984) is also one of the
most urbanized of the developing countries. Urban population in the early
i980s was increasing about 5S. per year, or about three times the estimated
growth rate of the total population. This rapid urbanization along with
remarkable economic growth beginning in the 1960s overextended all urban
services, particularly water supply and waste disposal. The relatively low
priority that had been given to the water supply sector and the piecemeal
approach to improvements that had been followed did not meet the growing needs
and resulted in rapidly decreasing levels of service.
2. In the late 1970s, the Government began to give increased priority
to social infrastructure, started to make substantial higher investments in
the water supply sector and approached multilateral agencies for assistance
with the financial, management, operational, project planning and water
resource exploitation problems of the water supply sector. The objectives
were to upgrade and expand water services in water-scarce regions and urban
areas and to make better use of limited national water resources. This led to
a Bank loan for the First Water Supply Project (Loan 2072-KO) which was
approved in December 1981 and which was soon followed by Loan 2350-KO for the
Second Water Supply Project, approved in October 1983, and Loan 2491-KO for
the Metropolitan Region Water Supply Project, approved in February 1985 (Part
III, Section 1).
3. Project Preparation. The project was identified and feasibility
studies completed as part of the First Water Supply Project (Loan 2072-KO).
Detailed engineering for the Namgang Regional Water System (NRS) component of
the project was financed by the Ministry rf Construction (MOC) and carried out
by a local constzlting firm in association with a French firm. Detailed
engineering for the Taegu Water System (TWS) component was financed by Taegu
City and prepared by another local consulting firm with the assistance of two
firms from Japan.
4. Project preparation proceeded quickly and NRS and TWS components
were identified as suitable for Bank financing by a Bank mission in November
1964. A proposed third component for the Geum Ho Region was also evaluated by
the mission which concluded that it was not economically justified at that
time and not suitable for Bank financing, a conclusion which the Government
accepted (Part III, Section 2b).
5. An Important innovation for Korea was the design decision to treat
water provided by the NRS component prior to distribution to the beneficiary
comnunities, rather than to follow the usual practice in Korea of requiring
each community to treat the bulk water delivered to it. This improved the
economy of the project and reduced the cost of water to the consumers.
6. Pre-appraisal was in February 1985, at which time there were a
number of issues (Part III, Section 2b), including, fo.r the TWS, the lack of a
satisfactory investment plan for expansion of sewerage and the feasibility of
integrating water supply and sewer services of the city. For the NRS, the
most important issues were about adequacy of plans for constructing water
distribution facilities in the 13 communities to be served and about land
acquisition required to operate the existing Namgang Reservoir at elevations
required to meet future water demands. These issues were resolved
satisfactorily, for the time being, during appraisal, which took place in
April 1985 and during negotiations in July 1985. Appraisal, negotiations and
Board approval of the loan (in August, 1985) took place about five mon`is
ahead of the Bank's timetable for the project (Part III, Section 2a).
Project Objectives and Description
7. Objectives. The project consisted of two water supply
components: the NRS component to serve communities in Kyeongnam Province; and
the TWS component for Taegu City. As a whole, the project was expected to
improve water services to about two million people and provide public water
service for the first time to about 520,000 additional persons by 1991. The
objectives of the NRS component were to provide adequate and reliable treated
water to 13 cities, towns and villages, 9 of which had no public water
service, located in a poor area of the country where water shortages had been
a major hindrance to development and where the cause of serious conflicts
between municipalities over the use of limited ground water resources.
8. The TWS component was intended to increase water supply coverage
in Taegu, ensure adequate water service particularly to the low-income
population, reduce unaccounted-for water from about 40% of production to about
30% by 1990 and improve the organization of water supply and sewer services in
Taegu. Other project objectives were to extend the scope of a national bulk
water tariff study to include the NRS, and generally to promote sector
development through expanded dialogue with the Government.
9. Project Description. Annex 1 is the description of the project
as given in Schedule 2 of the Loan Agreement. The NRS component included a
water intake at Namgang Reservoir, about 80 km of transmission pipelines with
a capacity of 115,000 cubic meters per day (cu mid), a treatment plant with a
first stage capacity of 75,000 cu m/d and storage reservoirs of 12,000 cu m
capacity. Distribution networks in the two main cities were part of an
entirely separate project financed by the Asian Development Bank, and
distribution in the other communities was to be coordinated by the Ministry of
Home Affairs (MOHA) and financed from a fund established by MOHA for water
supply investments in small communities.
10. The TWS companent included a water intake on the Nakdong River,
transmission facilities, a 400,000 cu m/d treatment plant, storage reservoirs
of 80,000 cu m capacity, rehabilitation and expansion of distribution networks
and a study for improving the organization of water and sewerage services.
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11. The project was expected to be completed by December 31, 1988 at a
total cost, based on June 1985 prices, of W 84.5 billion (US$ 103.7 million
equivalent), including allowances for physical and price contingencies.
Project Organization and Design
12. Organization. The NRS component was to be implemented by MOC and
supervised by its Pusan Regional Construction and Management Agency (RCMA)
witi the support of the consultants engaged for detailed design (para. 3), the
appointment of which was a condition for loan disbursements for this
component. Bidding and contract awards were to be the responsibility of the
Office of Supply (OSROK), the Government's procurement agency. MOC's Water
and Sewerage Bureau was to provide coordination from Seoul as well as
coordination witn the Bank. After completion of the NRS facilities, the
assets and liabilities were to be transferred to the Industrial Sites and
Water Resources Development Corporation (ISWACO) which was to be responsible
for operation, maintenance and debt payment. ISWACO was an agency established
by the Gov,rnment in 1974 for the promotion of industrial sites and water
resources development, and was satisfactorily operating 9 other regional water
supply systems.
13. The TWS component was to be implemented by the Taegu City Water
Bureau (TWB) with the aid of the same consultants that were engaged for
detailed design (para. 3). Bidding and contract awards were to be the
responsibility of TWB with the support of OSROK. MOHA was to review the
organization of the Taegu water supply and sewerage services and evaluate the
feasibility of their integration. The concept of integrating these services
was innovative for Korea where only Seoul had a similar system.
14. The organizational arrangements, although complex because of the
vertical organization of the Government which tends to create coordination
problems, worked out satisfactorily. The only notable problem was a lack of
communication between MOC and RCMA. It appears that the consulting contract
for supervision of construction of the NRS component, a condition for
disbursements for that component, had been signed in August 1966 and was in
RMCA's possession, but was not forwarded to the Bank through MOC until March
1987. This could have delayed disbursements for the NRS component but for the
fact that MOC elected not to request disbursements for civil works (para. 32).
15. During project implementation, there were organizational changes,
but these did not affect the project. For Taegu, MOHA decided that, based on
experience in Seoul, there were advantages to combining the water supply and
sewerage agencies, and the TWB was reorganized into the Taegu Water Supply and
Sewerage Bureau (TWSB) effective April 1, 1967, a mo,e strongly supported by
the Bank. Also, in July 1988 the Government decided to split ISWACO into two
organizations, one of which, the Korean Water Resources Corporation (KOWACO),
assumed responsibility for water resources. The Bank had no objection to this
change and the completed NRS component was transferred to KOWACO under a
Transfer and Operations Agreement finalized in December 1989.
16. Project Design. Planning and design of the TWS component was
carried out very efficiently with good quality; factors which contributed to
substantial completion of this component on schedule.
17. Design of the NRS component was also very good, but marred by
planning factors. Firstly, the planned site of the water treatment plant had
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to be changed because the original site included a burial ground. Regardless
of compensation, there was unexpected resistance to removal of tombs. A new
site had to be acquired and designs of the plant and portions of the
transmission mains had to be revised, result;.ng in a delay of several, months
before construction could start (Part II, paras.1.5-1.7). There also were
delays in the acquisition of land required for sume critical pipelines. And
finally, there was an extended delay in establishing the elevation of the
water intake at the Namgang Reservoir. This was caused by a belated decision
by the Water Resources Bureau of MOC to raise the crest of the dam and revise
the design operating level of the reservoir, a possibility which had not been
brought up at the time of project preparation and appraisal. Taken together,
these planning shortcomings were the principal cause of delay of final
completion of the NRS component by about 21 months.
Project Implementation
18. Loan Effectiveness and Project Start-up. There were no
difficulties in meeting the conditions of effectiveness, and the loan became
effective on November 18, 1985, about one month ahead of the latest date for
effectiveness given in the loan agreement.
19. By the time the loan was approved, the project was in an advanced
stage of preparation. General Procurement Notices had been advertised, pre-
qualification of contractors for civil works had been carried out, detailed
design was substantially completed, and some contracts had been bid and were
ready for award by the time the loan was effective.
20. The TWS component proceeded quickly on schedule from that point.
Consultants for assistance with project construction supervision were
appointed in December 1985. Procurement and constructicn proceeded
substantially on schedule, or slightly ahead of schedule.
21. The NRS component, however, stalled almost immediately because of
the problem with water treatment plant site acquisition and then because of
the decision to revise the operating level of the reservoir (para. 17;.
Because procurement for the NRS component was delayed, signing of the
consultant contract for construction supervision was put off until August
1986. Once construction of the water treatment plant and intake got underway,
progress was faster than scheduled. Land acquisition to permit optimum
reservoir operation has been slow, however; by June 1991 only 33'. of the
required land was acquired (para. 6; Part II, para. 2.5).
22. Procurement. Procurement documents prepared by the consultants
for each project component benefitted from the experience of the consultants
and implementing agencies on other Bank financed projects and were generally
very good. Few comments on draft documents were required by Bank staff.
23. Pre-qualification, bidding, bid evaluations and contract award
procedures were carried out promptly and efficiently. A few times, however,
the Bank had to object to a proposed award to a company other than the low
evaluated bidder. These occurred under Local Competitive Bidding procedures
where, under certain circumstances, the national Budget Law allowed that bids
below 85Y. of the official cost estimate could be disqualified because of the
risk of substandard performance. Once, involving a contract valued below the
limit requiring the Bank's prior approval of award, the Bank approved the
award on an exceptional basis so as not to delay the project.
24. Although all contracts for supply of goods and all major
construction contracts were open for international competition, there was
limited interest by foreign firms and few were successful in winning
contracts. In most cases, foreign suppliers and contractors did not even
respond to invitations to pre-qualify. For the NRS component, the only
imported goods and services were small amounts of consulting services and
specialized mechanical and electrical equipment.
25. Project Costs. Appraisal estimates and actual costs of the
project are compared in Part III, Section 5a. The actual costs of the NRS
component totaled about W 27,330 million (US$ 35.2 million equivalent). These
totals are about 84% of the appraisal estimates when expressed in won, or
about 89% of the estimates when expressed in USS. Significant factors in the
cost savings for the NRS component were: very active competition for contracts
by qualified firms; well designed contract documents, generally efficient
procurement and implementation and good tight project management which
prevented costly claims for extra work because of misunderstandings, delays
and changes; and a very low and unexpected level of reliance on imported goods
and services, in'.luding consulting services. The only cost component which
exceeds estimates is for land acquisition.
26. The foreign exchange expenditures for goods and services directly
imported for Namgang were unexpectedly low; only about 9% of the total costs.
This can not be compared with the appraisal estimate of a 43% total foreign
cost component, however. The appraisal estimate also included the
considerable cost of imported inputs for goods produced in Korea and was the
result of a comprehensive analysis of the foreign cost of goods produced
locally and which might be used in the project. That type of analysis has not
been repeated for the PCR. Since the use of local goods and services was much
more than had been anticipated, it is probable that the actual indirect
foreign costs were also higher than the estimates, and that the proportion of
the actual total foreign cost component in the total project costs was
approximately the same as the estimates.
27. For Taegu, the reduction in actual costs compared to the appraisal
estimates was even more striking; the reported total actual costs were about
W39,100 million (US$49.1 million equivalent), or only about 75% of the
estimates, and the direct foreign exchange expenditures, only about 4X. of the
total, compared to an estimated total foreign component of 41%. The reasons
for the cost reduction appear to include all of the factors mentioned above
for Namgang. In addition, however, it appears that refinements were made in
the final designs and cost estimates after the appraisal estimates were made,
and that these resulted in a cost reduction of about W 2,000 million (US$2.45
million) below the appraisal estimates. It may be also that all of the costs
for the TWS component have not been properly charged to the project; there is
some uncertainty cost distribution between project and non-project capital
improvements for the Taegu water system during the project period.
28. The total actual costs of the entire project were W66,400 million
(US$84.3 million equivalent) or about 81% of the appraisal estimates. The
major savings were in the costs of materials and equipment (27%), civil works
(14.5%) and duties and taxes (53%X. The only increase in actual costs
compared to the appraisal estimates were for land acquisition (97%).
29. ,he only conclusion that appears to emerge from examination of the
appraisal estimates and actual cost data is that the estimates could not
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anticipate two key factors: the keen local competition for contracts which not
only kept local costs down but also virtually excluded foreign competition for
both supply and construction contracts; and the generally high level of
efficiency which was realized in procurement and project implementation.
30. Project Financing. Part III, Section 5b, compares the appraisal
estimates and actual sources and amounts of financing required for the
project. Although actual Bank loan disbursements for both the Namgang and
Taegu components were lower than the appraisal forecasts, the proportion of
total actual expenditures financed from the loan for each component was
somewhat higher. For Namgang, the loan financed about 42% of total
expenditures rather than the estimated 38%. And for Taegu, 39% of
expenditures, rather than 36X., were financed.
31. There were no delays or shortfalls in project funds provided from
local sources to cover the balance of the project costs.
32. Loan Allocations and Disbursements. The period between June 1967
and June 1988 was the only time when disbursements equaled or exceeded the
appraisal forecasts (Part III, Section 3a). Disbursements started slowly
mainly b)ecause of the delays on the NRS component and a decision by MOC not to
use Bank loan funds for civil works or consulting services (Part III, Section
3b), apparently because of concern that the cost of equipment and materials
would exceed estimates. MOC also delayed the establishment of a Special
Account and after it was opened it was seldom utilized (Part III, Section 7).
33. During the disbursement period, TWB promptly recognized the
probability of substantial cost savings and in February 1987 requested
cancellation of nearly US$2.3 million from Part B of the loan. MOC, hcwever,
may have realized that the total cost of equipment and materials would be
lower than estimated, but it elected to finance substantially the total cost
of this category from the loan and ended up using about 35% more than had been
allocated to the category originally. The difference came from the unused
amounts allocated for civil works, consulting fees and unallocated categories.
34. The project appraisal estimated that 100% of the Bank loan would
be disbursed for direct and indirect foreign exchange expenditures, although
the allocation procedures allowed for disbursement against local currency
expenditures. In fact, because of the very low direct foreign currency
expenditures for the project (paras. 26-27), about 84% of the loan was
disbursed for local currency expenditures, which, however, included mainly the
indirect foreign costs of goods produced locally.
35. There were major differances between the actual final a'locations
of the proceeds of the loan and what was anticipated when the loan was made
(Part III, Section 3b). For Namgang, as noted, no disbursements were made for
civil works. For Taegu, however, most of the civil works contracts were
partially financed (35% of expenditures) from the loan. Very little use was
made of the loan to finance consulting services for Namgang, and Taegu did not
use this category at all.
36. The loan closing date of June 30, 1990 corresponded with the
country profile for disbursemerts for Bank .financed projects in Korea and
there was no problem in meeting it. In fact, the final withdrawal application
was received more than four months before the closing date.
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Project Results
37. Physical Results. The project met substantially all of the
physical objectives, although late for Namgang (Part III, Section 6a). By
1990, both components provided convenient reliable service to nearly 250,000
additional persons - about 80% of the objectives for that date - of which
about 90,000 had not previously had access to public water service of any
type. Overall results by then would have been better except that distribution
works in some smaller communities served by NRS were completed late (Part III,
Section 7). By 1995, the total served by the two systems should number about
3.4 million, an increase of nearly 1.0 million persons over pre-project
levels. In addition, unaccounted-for, or non-revenue water in Taegu had been
reduced from about 38% of production in 1984 to about 29% in 1990, which was
even better than the project objective (Part II, para. 10.1). The combined
results of the two components by 1995, however, could depend on the success of
acquiring for NRS the land required to operate the reservoir at optimum levels
(paras. 6 and 21).
38. Financial Results. The financial results were significantly below
the appraisal forecasts (Part III, Section 6c). For KOWACO, responsible for
the NRS bulk water supply system operations, net operating income for 1989 was
only about 30% of forecasts, and the rate of return on net fixed assets in
operation was about 2% compared to the loan covenant requirement of 5%. Debt
service coverage was less than 1.0. Much of the problem with KOWACO's
financial performance stems from a Government freeze on tariff increases,
beginning in 1987, as part of its price stabilization policy. The project
monitoring indicators (Part III, Section 4) show, however, that some of the
problem may lie with KOWACO. In 1990, for example, KOWACO's personnel had
increased about 66% since 1985, compared to the appraisal forecast of about
15%, and personnel costs were about 18% of operating expenses, compared to the
10% forecast.
39. Financial performance of the TWS was also diminished by the
Government freeze on tariff increases (Part III, Sections 4 and 6c). The rate
of return on net fixed assets in operation had fallen to about 4% by 1990,
compared to a loan covenant requirement of 8%. Taegu appears to have
maintained better control over its financial position than KOWACO, however,
and its net operating revenue was about 70% of forecasts for 1990. The number
of employees was about 10% below forecasts for 1990 and the actual increase
since 1984 was only about 4%.
40. Economic Results. In spite of financial performance which have
been below expectations by both water supply agencies, the economic results of
the two project components appear to be reasonably close to what was
predicted, although the recalculated rates of return are admittedly based on
incomplete data (Part III, Section 6b). For the NRS component, the
recalculated incremental financial rate of return (IFRR), used as a proxy for
the economic rate of return (ERR) is about 2%, substantially the same as the
appraisal forecast. Like the appraisal forecast, this is based on the bulk
water supply aspects of the NRS only. In the event that bulk water tariffs
are not raised considerably above the 1990/1991 levels, the IFRR would fall
well below 1%, and, in combination with rising operating costs the IFRR could
be negative. The IFRR can not be taken as the only criteria to judge a
project with a useful life of 30 oramore years, however. In a case like this,
the ERR is a more significant measure.
41. The appraisal forecast for the ERR of the NRS compotient was about
6%. This was based on the retail water aspects of the NRS operations and
expected increases in the value of properties served. The ERR has not been
recalculated because continuous records on the finances of the 13 communities
responsible for distribution to the ultimate consumers and the effect the
project may have had on the values of the properties served have not been
obtained. Nevertheless, there is no evidence to indicate that the
recalculated ERR would be less than the 6% estimated at appraisal.
42. For the TWS component, the appraisal used only the IFRR as a proxy
for the ERR. This has been recalculaced from data and assumptions close to
what were used in the appraisal forecasts, and the results indicate a return
of about 16%, compared to the forecast of 18%. As in the case of Namgang, the
recalculated IFRR benefitted considerably from the savings in project costs
compared to the appraisal estimates.
43. Tnstitutional Results. The objective of combining Taegu City's
water supply and sewerage services to improve coordination and the efficiency
of planning, investments, use of resources and operations (paras. 8 and 15)
was important because in 1985 the city was starting to implement a sewerage
master plan and to levy sewer service charges. A loan covenant (Part III,
Section 7) required a review of the Taegu organizations by MOHA in cooperation
with the City Administration and the Directors General of the relevant
bureaus. A report, including final recommendations and implementing
guidelines, was to be prepared for review by the gank by the end of 1986. The
study objectives and scope of work were described in an annex to the appraisal
report, and were an issue during the project appraisal and loan review
periods, particularly as to the prospect for implementation of any of the
study's recommendations (Part III, Section 2b).
44. Actually, the study and the actions taken were not at all what had
been envisioned by the Bank. There was only an internal study based on a
review of experience in Seoul. No formal study report was presented to the
Bank, although Bank missions did discuss the matter extensively in Korea, and
in 1987, MOHA decided to combine the water supply and sewerage services in
Taegu and several other cities. The opinion of the Taegu authorities (Part
II, para. 8.1) is that the formation of the Taegu Water Supply and Sewerage
Bureau really was a combination in name only; the single result was that the
Sewerage Bureau came under the control of the Director of the Water Bureau.
45. This occurred during a period when there were extensive and
politically sensitive studies of the water sector organization in Korea and
the Bank was insisting on the need to reorganize management of both water
supply and sewerage services. There was thought to establishment of regional
water authorities, but there also were strong pressures for decentralization
of government. In 1990, there was a major reorganization of the water supply
sector and water corporations were created for the first time in Korea.
Unfortunately, this included separation of management of water and sewerage
services, at least until such time as sewerage becomes self-financing and
could be included in the corporations. Thus, the Taegu Water Supply and
Sewerage Bureau was divided and the sewerage section was transferred to the
Construction Bureau. The result of all this was that the project contribution
to significant institutional changes which could lead to more efficient
coordination of Taegu's water supply and sewerage development and operations
was minimal.
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Project Sustainability
46. The principal recognizable risk to the project's achievement and
enhancement of its potential benefits has been the Government's resistance to
allowing the water supply agencies to set tariffs and other charges at
reasonable levels to enable them to operate efficiently and economically,
service their debt obligations and make significant contributions to the costs
of improving and expanding services. Sustainability could be jeopardized also
by a failure to acquire for the NRS the land necessary to operate the
reservoir at levels necessary to meet future water demands (paras. 6, 21 and
37).
Bank Performance
47. Project preparation, appraisal and processing of the loan was very
efficient and proceeded quickly in spite of a large number of issues which had
to be resolved during those stages (Part III, Section 2b). The loan was
approved about five month, ahead of the original project timetable.
48. The records show that communication between Bank staff and their
Korean counterparts was prompt and forthright and that Bank staff were
understanding and receptive to changes where needed. Nevertheless, there were
some communication problems, principally in the field, because of the language
barrier. This was overcome somewhat by engaging local consultants to assist
Bank missions in collecting information.
49. The Bank budgeted limited resources for project supervision
because of the expected capability of the implementing agencies. The
supervision missions - only seven over the five-year implementation period -
were widely spaced and all missions had multiple projects with which to deal.
Not all missions visited the sites because of time constraints; instead
mission members concentrated on discussions at the head offices of government
departments, implementing agencies and consultants in Pusan and Seoul.
Because of the competence and experience of the implementing agencies and
consultants and the very constructive relationship which prevailed between the
Bank and representatives of the local agencies, however, the limited
supervision did not appear to have had an adverse effect on the physical
outcomes of the two project components.
Borrower/Implementing Agency Performance
50. Performance of the Borrower and the implementing agencies in
carrying out the project and satisfying the principal covenants in the loan
documents was generally very good (Part III, Section 7). The notable
exceptions were the planning and decision making problems relating to the NRS
component (paras. 17 and 21), the slow progress in acquiring land for optimum
operation of the NRS reservoir (paras. 21, 37 and 46) and the failure by the
Government to abide by the agreement to maintain water tariffs at necessary
levels (paras. 38-39; and Part III, Section 7).
51. Performance of the implementing agencies in their roles on
procurement and project administration was generally excellent. Bank records
indicate, however, that problems existed; the agencies tended to delegate too
much responsibility to their engineering consultants in communicating with the
Bank on matters of management, operations, financial performance and project
expenditures and projections. The concerns, opinions and performance data of
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the responsible agencies appear seldom to have been communicated directly to
the Bank.
52. Another similar problem was that the consultants tended, as usual,
to maintain cost records on one basis while the agency accountants may use
another, particularly with reference to the allocations of costs, the times
when obligations were incurred or payments made, and the methods used in
converting values from one currency to another. Neither basis may be
incorrect, but in a short time the reconciliation of figures, which should be
the responsibility of the agencies, becomes almost impossible. This
difficulty was particularly apparent on this project; the records show that
Bank supervision missions often were unable to report with reasonable accuracy
on the actual expenditures and expected total costs of the two project
components, and this has proved to be an obstacle in preparing periodic and
the final evaluations of project performance.
Performance of Consultants
53. The consultants were well qualified and experienced in working
with the executing agencies and the Bank. Cooperation between the parties and
the quality of the work was good. The consultants took the initiative and had
no hesitation in calling in outside technical assistance when needed on
specialized work, such as the testing and start-up of water treatment plants.
Performance of Suppliers and Contractors
54. Performance of all suppliers and contractors was generally good,
although there were some minor delays resulting from strikes at suppliers'
plants. Construction quality was good.
Project Documentation and Data
55. The legal documents (Loan Agreement, Project Agreement and
Subsidiary Loan Agreement) were appropriate for this project. The Staff
Appraisal Report (SAR) served as a useful guide to Bank staff during
implementation. There is no evidence, however, that the implementing
agencies, their consultants or their auditors made much use of the (SAR). For
example, the SAR includes clear examples of the content and format of the
project monitoring indicators which were to be covered in the periodic
progress reports, but the reports, although detailed, seldom included that
information in useable form.
56. One item missing from the legal documents was a specific
commitment requiring the implementing agencies to prepare project completion
reports and furnish them to the Bank. This added to the difficulty of trying
to convey to the agencies the intent and significance of the effort to prepare
a retrospective assessment of the project as a means of understanding and
benefiting from the project experience. This is particularly true in the case
of Taegu (Part 11, Section B).
Conclusions and Lessons Learned
57. This was a well conceived, timely and very successful project by
any standard, and the benefits upon completion are high. Preparation and loan
eff?ctiveness were accomplished in record time. Designs were excellent.
Planning was marred only by two problenms on the Namgang component: the
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original site of the water treatment plant was not selected with appropriate
examination and the decision about raising the dam and operating level of the
reservoir should have made earlier. The project was carried out economically,
substantially below the estimated costs and, except for the problems mentioned
above which hampered the Namgang component, implementation was efficient.
58. The principal lessons emerging from the project experience are:
a) thorough project preparation by an efficient and technically
qualified implementing agency can lead to a very successful
project, but, as in the case of the Namgang component, failure to
make a thorough field examination of design decisions to assure
land availability or to make timely decisions relative to critical
project components, can cause avoidable delays (Part I, para. 17;
Part II, paras. 1.6-1.9);
b) well designed contract documents, quick and efficient procurement
procedures and good tight project management can keep project
costs under control by reducing delays, changes, disputes,
misunderstandings and contractor claims for extra compensation
(Part I, para. 25);
c) cooperative, understanding and receptive attitudes by staff on
both sides - the executing agencies and the Bank - can result in
efficient communication and quick resolution of most differences
which can arise during project preparation and implementation
(Part I, paras. 48-49; Part II, para. 5.2);
d) determination and efficiency in applying leak detection technology
and applying other measures for reducing unaccounted-for or non-
revenue water can be very successful even in a large system
containing significant amounts of old distribution pipelines
(Part I, paras. 8 and 37; Part II, para 10.1);
e) appraisal teams on any project which might conflict with the
interests of other government agencies, or other parts of the
implementing agency, should assure that other development plans or
activities are unlikely to disrupt implementatiun of the proposed
project (Part I, para. 17; Part II, paras. 1.8, 2.2 and 2.4);
f) Bank supervision missions should carefully review all project
cost, forecasting and reporting procedures to assure that there is
a clear understanding of how the records should be kept and
reported for Bank purposes (Part I, para. 52); and
g) if the internal financial or economic rates of return are to be
recalculated upon project completion, then it is essential for
Bank staff to assure that up-to-date records of the necessary
inputs are available and obtained when the project is completed
(Part 1, paras. 40-42, Part III, Section 6b).
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PROJECT COMLETION REPORT
KOREA
NAHGANG AND TAEGU WATER SUPPLY PROJECT
(LOAN 2615-KO)
PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE
1-
A. NMtGAN6 WATER 6IJPPLY COWIONENT
1. Project Preparation, Organization and Design
1.1 The master plan and feasibility study engineering for this project were
completed in August 1983 by a French consulting engineering firm in
association with two local firms . Detailed design was carried out by a local
consulting firm with the assistance of a French firm and a local firm, and was
completed in September 1985.
1.2 During preappraisal by a Bank mission in February 1985, the most
important issue was about additional land acquisition required to operate the
existing Jinyaug Reservoir (Namgang Dam) at the original design level so as to
meet the major municipal and industrial water demands in the area to be
served. The issue was concluded wsith a loan covenant requiring completion of
land acquisition in accordance with a satisfactory schedule.
1.3 The project was implemented by the Ministry of Construction (MOC) and
supervised by its Pusan Regional Construction and Management Agency (RCMA).
Bidding and contract awards were implemented by the Office of Supply (OSROK).
After completion of the project, the Industrial Sites and Water Resources
Development Corporation (ISWACO), now replaced by the Korea Water Resources
Corporation (KOWACO) was to be responsible for operation, maintenance and debt
payment. Although the organization was complicated, the project worked out
satisfactorily except for a lack of communication between the agencies.
1.4 Design of the project facilities was very good, but the original sites
of both the water treatment plant and the raw water intake station had to be
changed because of site acquisition problems and the Namgang new dam program.
1.5 The water treatment plant site was selected from three proposed sites
including the site near the Sacheon Air Force Base where the plant was finally
constructed. At the master plan and detailed design stages, however, the
military authorities did not agree to the selection of that site because of
1/ This is the Completion Report for the Namgang component provided to the
Bank by KOWACO and its consultants in July 1991. The text has been
altered by inserting some supplementary background information which was
provided later by KOWACO and which is considered by Bank staff to be
useful for the purposes of the PCR. An additional report, "Project
Completion Report for Construction" (December 1989), of 268 pages was
provided by the consulting engineers for this component but has not been
reproduced here although some of the consultant's comments have been
inserted herein and some data from that report have been incorporated in
the statistical information in Part III of this report.
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the military safety regulations of the base. Therefore, another site, which
included an informal burial ground, was surveyed and selected after receipt of
a letter from the local Sacheon-Gun office recommending the site.
1.6 About two years from the time of the original treatment plant site
selection, land acquisition work was started by RCMA. But the families
concerned with the burial ground delayed schedules for compensation
negotiations and finally refused all of RCMA's offers.
1.7 In consideration for the overall construction schedule, MOC and RCMA
resolved to change the site and again contacted the military authorities with
revised technical data for the treatment plant facilities. After several
meetings, the military authority agreed to the new site with the condition
that elevations of several buildings be lowered. The local consultants
engaged for field supervision then made the design revisions required for' both
the treatment plant and the related transmission mains in three months.
1.8 The design for the raw water intake station site was based on a flood
water level (FWL) of 40.5m and a low water level (LWL) of 32.Om at the
existing Namgang Dam, and the original site was about 1 km upstream from the
supplementary spillway into Sacheon Bay. The Water Resources Bureau of MOC,
however, then established the new Namgang Dam program to raise the dam height
about Sm above the existing crest. During the planning for this new program,
the water level of the raw water intake for the Namgang Regional Water Supply
System project was changed from elevation 29.Om to elevation 36m and finally
decided at elevation 32m.
1.9 With the proposed new FWL at elevation 46.0m, the originally designed
intake station would be submerged. Therefore, the intake station had to be
relocated to a site about 80m upstream from the original site in order to
intake safely at the operating levels of both the existing and the new dams.
While the consultants performed design revisions of the intake pumping station
and the raw water transmission mains in two months, the construction work
could not start timely because the final policy decisions for the new dam had
been delayed by reviews of the vast investment problems and additional land
acquisition requirements.
2. Project Implementation and Performance
2.1 The construction work (treatment plant and transmission mains) was
carried out in two groups (Lot 1 and Lot 2). Lot 1 was implemented in four
separate contracts between December 1985 and May 1989. Lot 2 was implemented
in three separate contracts between October 1986 and May 1989. Procurement of
equipment and materials (including some installation) was carried out under
six different contracts. As of December 1989, installation of equipment was
substantially complete and commissioning was in progress, but final completion
would not take place until the last half of 1990 because of delays in some
specialized wiring work.
2.2 There were no difficulties in implementing the project until Lot # 1 was
contracted in December 1985 and RCMA started negotiations for the water
treatment plant site. Then the project bogged down because of the land
acquisition problem and the delayed decisions on the new Namgang Dam program
and the operating level of the new dam.
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2.3 Performance of the Bank on project preparation, appraisal and processing
of the loan was carried out efficiently in spite of a large number of issues.
2.4 Performance of the Government and the implementing agencies was
generally very gooot except on the planning and decision making relating both
to the treatment plant site and the Namgang dam.
2.5 KOWACO currently is executing the Namgang New Dam project and has a
program for acquiring 10.42 sq km of land (elevations 39.00m to 49.00m). As
of June 1991, KOWACO performed 32.6% progress on the land acquisition up to
about elevation 41.00, which means the existing dam can be operated about at
the original design water level during dry or flood conditions.
2.6 According to the ISWACO Study of Bulk Water Tariffs, the water tariffs
should have been raised about 20% annually to maintain a sound financial
balance. However, KOWACO was unable to maintain the tariffs at the necessary
levels because of the Government policy for public price stabilization. The
current water tariffs (effective in February 1991) are 43.16 won per cu m for
raw water and 87.55 won per cu m for treated water. The total raises in rates
since 1986 are only about 16' for treated water and about 22% for raw water.
A Government program for increasing water tariffs calls for raises for both
raw water and treated water categories of 13.5% in 1992 and 7% per year in
1983, 1984 and 1985.
3. Project Cost
3.1 The investment for the Nam River Project as forecast at the time of the
feasibility study and compared with the actual is as follows:
Appraisal Actual
Million USS Million Won Million USS Million Won
39.51 32,273 35.12 26,888
3.2 The above difference between appraisal and actual can be analyzed as
follows:
(a) actual total investment amounted to W26,888 million, which is
about 83.3% of the of the planned investment of W32,273 million at
the stage of the feasibility study;
(b) due to the revaluation of the Korean won against the US$ during
the project period, the actual investment amount of the foreign
components was significantly reduced compared with those planned;
(c) through the bidding system in Korea, contracts have been awarded
to the lowest bid pri-e. Consequently the actual expenditure is
much lower than the dppraisal amount.
1/ This section added by Bank staff from consultant's "Project Completion
Report for Construction Supervision", December 1989.
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4. Sianificance and Effect of the Project
4.1 The Nam River Water Supply Project involves two cities, two "eups"
(towns) and 13 "myuns" (rural communities). For a good water supply and
balanced development of these areas, the MOC established a master plan for
water supply (75,000 cu m/d capacity in the first phase and 121,000 cu mld in
the second)and completed the first phase in May 1989. The second phase is
planned to start in 1994 and to reach its full capacity in 1996.
4.2 The project has been designed so that the raw water intake, the
treatment processes and treated water transmission can be completely
controlled by a telemetry/computer system newly developed for the pumping
station at the Jinyang (Namgang) reservoir, the Sacheon water treatment.plant
and the 99.7 km of pipeline. With completion, the project is significant in
that it can supply good and sufficient water to the residents, thus improving
public health and community development.
4.3 The new Namgang Dam program is significant because of its effect on the
reservoir for the Namgang water supply project. It reinforced the existing
concrete faced rockfill dam, constructed in 1969, and increased the height by
Bm to improve flood control of the Nam River and Sacheon Bay, and guarantee
adequate water supply for domestic, industrial and irrigation use in the area
west of Kyungnam. It also involved development of water resources for
hydroelectric power generation.
5. Conclusions and Lessons Learned
5.1 The implementing agency can c,-- out a very successful project.
Failure to make a thorough field survey, however, or failure by related
authorities to make timely decisions about critical project matters can lower
the overall quality of the project performance.
5.2 Cooperative and understanding attitudes between the Bank and
implementing agencies can make efficient communication and quick resolution of
critical issues.
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B. TAEGU WATER SYSTEM
6. Background
6.1 The Taegu Water Supply Fourth Extension Project, immediately following
the third extension project financed by an IBRD loan, was to extend the wsater
supply system capacity by 400,000 cu mid to meet the demand of Taegu City in
1990. The project was partially financed by an IBRD loan and the basic design
and detailed design have been carried out by a Korean consulting engineering
firm in association with the original Japanese consultants (who prepared the
master plan and feasibility studies) 2/. The project included expansions of
the intake pumping station, the treatment plant and the water transmission and
distribution systems.
7. Project History
7.1 The feasibility study of the Taegu Water Supply Fourth Extension Project
was made during the Third Extension Project (financed from Bank loan 2072-KO).
The results of the study were reviewed by the consultants on the basis of more
recent water supply data. This review was completed on August 18, 1984 and
the feasibility of the project was identified by the IBRD. The IBRD loan
agreement for the project, together with the Namgang water supply extension
project, was signed on September 23, 1985. The City of Taegu was to execute
the project under a subsidiary loan agreement with the Government, and the
amount of the loan allocated for the project was USS23.0 million. The basic
and detailed design were completed by the consultants on July 2, 1985.
7.2 The project history can be summarized as follows:
June 19, 1984: Consultant services for feasibility studies and
detailed design commenced.
Nov. 27, 1984: Project approved (identified by Bank mission) 2/.
Dec. 30, 1984: Prequalification of bidders aavertised.
Jul. 12, 1985: Basic design and detailed design completed.
Sep. 23, 1985: Loan Agreement signed.
Oct. 5, 1985: Contract for Lot No. 3 (transmission pipeline) signed.
Oct. 11, 1985: Bidding for Lot No. 2 (treatment plant construction).
Nov. 24, 1985: Subsidiary Loan Agreement signed.
Nov. 26, 1985: Contract for Lot No. 2 signed.
Dec. 13, 1985: Consulting contract for construction supervision
signed.
1/ Contributions to the PCR by Taegu City's Water Supply Agency are limited
to a largely technical 31 page Construction Supervision Completion
Report dated 1989 and prepared by the engineering consultants for the
Taegu component and supplementary information provided to the Bank in
July and August 1991. Information from these sources has been compiled
by Bank staff into a semblance of a suitable contribution to this
completion report. In doing so, only information considered appropriate
for a completion report has been included and no expressions of opinion
have been changed or eliminated. Some data from these sources has been
incorporated in the statistical information in Part III.
2/ Comment in brackets added by Bank staff.
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Apr. 6, 1986: Contract for Lot No. 1 (intake pumping station
construction) signed.
May 24, 1986: Contract for Lot No. 2 (treatment plant construction.
phase 2) signed.
June 12, 1986: First distribution system construction contract (two
sections of Lot No. 4) signed.
Dec. 15, 1986: Contract for Lot No. 2 (river improvement works)
signed.
Dec. 17, 1986: Last contract for transmission pipeline construction
(Lot No. 3) signed.
June 16, 1987: Last contract for water treatment plant construction
(Lot No. 2, phase 3) signed.
Sep, 7, 1987: First contract for service reservoir construction work
(Lot No. 4, Sang-Ri reservoir) signed.
June 14, 1988: Contract for booster pumping stations (Daemyeong and
Chilgok) signed.
Aug. 3, 1968: Last contract for service reservoir construction
(Chisan and Apsan) signed.
Dec. 19, 1988: Contract for power transmission main (Lot No. 1)
signed.
May 14, 1989: Construction supervision completed.
8. Organization
8.1 The combining of the Water Supply and Sewerage Bureaus in 1987 was not
actually a combining; the Sewerage Bureau, responsible for the sewerage
projects of the city, came under the control of the director of the Water
Supply Bureau, and the name of the Water Supply Bureau was changed to Water
Supply and Sewerage Bureau. It was no more than a simple name change of city
organizations. The special accounts for water supply and sewerage projects
continued to be absolutely separated.
8.2 The Water Supply and Sewerage Bureau was separated again in 1990 when
the water supply project operation organization was reorganized as the Water
Supply Project Head Office on September 1, 1989. Accordingly, the sewerage
section was transferred to the control of the Construction Bureau.
9. Water Tariffs and Production Costs
9.1 For 1989, the status of water production costs and tariffs for Taegu
City was as follows:
Production cost: 248.7 won/cu m
_/
Selling unit price: 198.9 won/cu m
Deficit per cubic meter: 47.8 won
Annual deficit: 9,251 million won
Deficit ratio: 24.5%
a/ Levels of water tariffs in other cities was:
Pusan City: 223.0 won/cu m
Incheon: 233.8 won/cu m
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9.2 In 1990 the average production cost was 276 won/cu m while the average
selling price was 202 won/cu m and the deficit for the year was won 12,623
million.
9.3 Effective February 1, 1991, Taegu City's average water tariff w;as
increased 12.1% representing a revenue increase of won 5.3 billion. Financial
pressure has increased due to the rapid increase of debt for water supply.
The deficits went up due to the water tariff freeze policy from 1985 to 1990.
An additional increase of the water tariff - more than 24.5% - could be well
managed: for example a 10% increase in 1992 and 1993.
10. TaeQu's Water Leak Prevention Project
10.1 The water leak prevention project was executed in accordance with an
IBRD loan water supply leak prevention project which was carried out by the
Ministry of Home Affairs from March 1985 to September 1986, as follows:
(a) introduction of new leak detection equipment and techniques;
(b) planned replacement of old pipelines;
(c) utilization of corrosion resisting materials and improvement of
pipe-joint methods;
(d) thoughtful execution of pipeline works;
(e) control of water pressure: improvement of water treatment plant
operation and control of gate valves in high and low areas; and
(f) improved maintenance of water supply distribution network.
10.2 The ratio of revenue water to water produced has been gradually improved
from 65.2% in 1986 to 71.5% in 1990 as shown below:
Year: 1986 1987 1989 1989 1990
Achievement: 65.2% 67.3% 70.3% 71.0% 71.5%
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POJECT COETION REPORT
KOREA
NAMGANG AND TAEGU WATER SUPPLY PROJECT
(LOAN 261 1-KO)
PAT III: STAISTAL INEOMIO
1. Related Bank Loans
Title Purpose Aporoved Status Comment
First Water Expansion of water 12/17/81 Complete Project was first
Supply Project supply service in 06/30/86. stage of Bank
(Ln. 2072-K0) five cities and (PPAR No. involvement with
improvement of sector 8174). long term program
organization and of sector reforms.
project preparation. Project included
works for Taegu
City including
identification and
feasibility
studies for
Namgang and Taegu
Water Project.
Second Water Improve availability 10/18/83 Complete Project continued
Supply Project and quality of water 06/30/89. sector reform
(Ln. 2350-K0) supply for cities in (PCR No. programs,
the Nakdong River 8675). including
basin, implement leak development of
detection programs, MIS systems for
improve financial all Water Bureaus.
management of Water
Bureaus and improve
pricing policies.
Metropolitan To provide water to 02/05/85 Complete Project included
Region Water 25 municipalities, 12/30/90. strengthening of
Supply Project evaluate bulk water fCR in ISWACO and studies
(Ln. 2491-K0) tariff policies and preparation to identify more
organization of rational policies
water services in and criteria for
the metropolitan tariffs for raw
area and improve and treated bulk
financial management water supplies.
of the Industrial
Sites and Water
Resources
Development Corp.
(ISWACO).
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2. Project Timetable and Issues Raised
a) Project Timetable
Activity/ Date Date Date
Event Planned _ Revised Actual
Project Identification -- 11/84
Preappraisal Mission 01/85 02/85 02/85
Appraisal Mission 04/85 -- 04/85
Negotiations 12/85 07/85 07/08-11/85
Board Approval 01/86 08/85 08/27/85
Loan/Credit Signature -- 09/23/85 09/23/85
Loan/Credit Effectiveness 10/31/85 12/23/85 11/18/85
Closing Date 06/30/90 -- 06/30/90
Final Disbursement 10/31/90 -- 02/15/90
Project Completion 12/31/88 06/30/90 09/30/90
b) Issues Raised (Preaapraisal throuah Board Prwentation)
Identification Stage:
Project Content: The project as originally proposed by the Korean
authorities included a Geum River component. The Bank's project
identification mission, however, concluded that this component was not
economic at that time and not justified for Bank financing. The Government
subsequently agreed to delete the Geum River component.
Construction Supervision: Timing for the establishment of project offices
and appointment of consultants for construction supervision was uncertain
at the time of the preappraisal mission. During the appraisal it was
agreed that the consultants for Taegu would be appointed prior to award of
the first construction contract, and for Namgang, prior to any loan
withdrawals for this project component.
Preap2raisal Stage:
Project Costs: Both project components were considered by Bank staff to
require refinement of designs to improve phasing, take advantage of
possible economies and reduce costs. By the time of appraisal, both
components had been reduced in size, by reduction of excess capacity, and
made more economic and efficient.
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2. ProJect Tiuetablu and Issuu Raised (Continued)
b)_ Issu. Rainad (Pre.apraiual throuoh Board Presentation)
Preaeoraisal Stage: (Continued)
Taegu Subproject:
Water Demand Forecasts: Bank staff considered the demand
forecasts to be unrealistic. Demand forecasts were improved
following the preappraisal and were accepted by the appraisal
mission.
Distribution Network: Information about the existing network and
proposed additions was inadequate to demonstrate that system would
be adequate to utilize the additional water supply and to provide
water to all unserved low-income areas. Computer simulations of
the existing distribution network and planned improvements,
prepared after the preappraisal, demonstrated that the proposed
project would be able to provide water to all city areas for at
least the next seven years.
Sewerage: Bank staff considered that planning for increases in
sewerage capacity to handle the increased waste water that would
result form the project were too indefinite. The Bank engaged an
independent local consultant to review Taegu Sewerage Master Plan
and recommend investments. During appraisal, review of the
sewerage investment program and tariffs (to be implemented in July
1985) satisfied the appraisal team that the program was adequate
to maintain a satisfactory sanitation status in the city.
Integration of Water Supply and Sewerage Operations: Bank staff
considered that the feasibility of integration of these services
for Taegu as a means of improving the allocation of resources and
the efficiency and economy of operations and expansions should be
studied, although this was not the practice in Korea. Taegu City,
however, was reluctant to undertake a study, partly because MOHA,
not the City, had authority over organizational matters but were
not involved in the project for Taegu. By the time of appraisal
there was consensus by MOF, MOC and MOHA there were advantages to
integration and that a study could be done by expanding the term
of reference of the consultants that would provide technical
assistance for project implementation.
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2. Project Timetable and Issues Raised (Continued)
b) Issues Raised (Preappraisal throuah Board Presentation)
Preappraisal Stage: (Continued)
Namaang Subproject:
Water Demand. Allocations and Distribution: The water demand and
capacity allocations for each of the municipalities to be served
were considered by Bank staff to be too preliminary. Also, plans
for construction of distribution systems in the 13 communities
were uncertain. By the time of appraisal, plans had been made to
finance distribution works in the two main cities through a loan
from the Asian Development Bank, and MOHA had agreed to coordinate
the distribution improvements in the other 11 municipalities with
financing from a fund established by MOHA for water supply
investments in small towns (the Eups' Water Fund).
Availability of Water Resources: Additional studies needed to
determine whether the capacity of the Namgang reservoir would have
to be increased to meet demands after 1991, and how this might be
accomplished. By the time of appraisal, studies showed that if
the reservoir were operated as originally designed - particularly
by allowing the reservoir to fill to the maximum design levels -
there would be sufficient water to all projected demands. But
this would require additional land acquisition and priority for
satisfaction of demands would have to be given to public and
municipal use. The appraisal team concluded that it would be
necessary to have a loan covenant requiring the land acquisition
to be completed by the end of 1988. This proposed covenant was
changed later. (See Negotiations, below.)
Appraisal Stage:
Taegu Subproject:
The TWB's investment program and financial projections required
revisions based on the appraisal mission's recommendation that the
TWB should achieve a rate of return of 8% on revalued fixed
assets, starting in 1986, and that certain investments should be
postponed for about two years. A revised investment program,
financial projections and commitments with regard to financial
performance were accepted by the Bank during negotiations.
Post- Appraisal:
The Large Number of Project Issues: At the decision meeting, the
appraisal team explained that while there were many conditions, there
was basic agreement with the concerned ministries concerning the team's
recommendations. There was some uncertainty, however, about the
feasibility study of the integration of Taegu's water and sewerage
services (see under Preappraisal Stage above), but although the
environment for implementation seemed unfavorable because the prospect
for applicability to other cities could arouse political sensitivities,
on balance, the prospect for implementation of the study's
recommendations remained good.
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2. Project Timetable and Issues Raised (Continued)
b) Issues Raised (PreanDraisal throuah Board Prnentation)
Post-Appraisal: (Continued)
Leoal Documents: For the Taegu component, the proposed use of
Subsidiary Loan Agreement between the Government and the City of Taegu
rather than a Project Agreement between the Bank and the City was
questioned. Because there was uncertainty whether a Project Agreement
with the City could be signed, however, it was agreed that a Subsidiary
Loan Agreement, continuing the procedure used in previous loans to Korea
for water supply projects, would be satisfactory, and that execution of
that agreement would be a condition of loan effectiveness.
Management Review:
Unaccounted-for Water: Bank management, which questioned the target for
reduction of unaccounted-for water from about 40% to about 30% as being
inadequate, was satisfied with the response that reduction of more than
2X per year would be an unrealistic goal for Taegu's water system.
Negotiations:
Loan Amount: Rather than a loan of $42.5 million as proposed by the
Bank, the Korean delegation proposed, and Bank staff agreed to, a loan
of US$39.0 million, based on revised cost estimates which took account
of the Government's success in controlling inflation and the current
competitiveness in the construction sector.
Land Acquisition for Namoang Reservoir: The Korean delegation persuaded
the Bank to delete reference in the Loan Agreement to a specific date
for completing land acquisition around the reservoir, and to replace it
with a statement to the effect that the program of land acquisition
would be completed according to a schedule satisfactory to the Bank.
Study of Integration of Taegu's Water Supply and Sewerage Services:
Rather than have the City of Taegu responsible for the study, as had
been suggested by the Bank, the Korean delegation proposed, and the Bank
agreed, that the study would be undertaken by MOHA which oversees the
organization of local governments.
Retroactive Financing: Provisions in the loan documents for retroactive
financing were deleted because the Bank's rapid progress in processing
the loan made it unnecessary.
Board Presentation: There were no staff presentations and no discussion by
the Executive Directors during the Board meeting when this loan was
approved.
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3. Loan Disbursemnts
a) Cumlative Estimated and Actual Disbursements
(US * '000)
IBRD FY Appraisal Actual
and Semester Estimate % of Appraisal
Ending Amount Amount Estimate
1986
12/31/85 0.0
06/30/86 3.0 1.50 50%
1987
12/31/86 6.3 1.50 24%
06/30/87 11.6 3.90 33%
1988
12/31/87 19.1 12.99 68%
06/30/88 26.6 22.43 84Y
1989
12/31/86 31.6 30.29 96.
06/30/89 36.4 33.21 91%
1990
12/31/89 38.0 33.29 88/
06/30/90 34.01 90%
1991
12/31/90 34.01 90?.
Cancellations:
On February 12, 1987 $ 2,262,000.00
On April 39 1989 1949000.00
On June 1, 1989 1,411,935.13
On July 2, 1990 122,191.01
Total Cancelled: 3,990,126.14
Net Amount of Loan: $ 34,009,873.86
Closing Date: Original: June 30, 1990
Revised: No revisions
Final:e June 30, 1990
Loan Account Closed: July 2, 1990
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3. Loan Disburs _mnts (Continued)
b) Original and Final Allocation of Proceeds
(US$ Equivalent)
Loan Agreement
Amount of % of Actual
Loan Expenditures Amount
Category Allocated To Be Financed Disbursed
Part A:
(1) Civil works 2,900,000 35% -0-
(2) Equipment and 10,600,000 100% of foreign 14,612,981
materials expenditures and
100% of local expen-
ditures (ex-factory
cost)
(3) Consultants' 500,000 50% 65,958
services
(4) Unallocated 1,000,000 -0-
for Part A
Part 8:
(5) Civil works 5,500,000 35% 7,232,245
(6) Equipment and 15,000,000 100% of foreign 12,104,690
materials expenditures and
100% of local expen-
ditures (ex-factory
cost)
(7) Consultants' 500,000 50% -0-
services
(8) Unallocated 2,000,000 -0-
Part B
Special Account -- 4,870
MOC (Part A)
Special Account -- -10,870
Taegu (Part B)
TOTAL 38.000.000 34,009,874
=========== ======~~~~~===s
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4. Project Implementation
Mlonitoring Indicatomr
A. KOWACO (ISWACO) WATER DIVISION
I/ 2/
Indicator Schedule Actual X of Appraisal Estimate
1988 1989 1990 1989 1999 1990 1988 1989 1990
DEfAND (Billion cu *1
Ran water sold 1263 1465 1561 1164 1345 1531 92% 92% 98%
Treated mater sold 16? 366 449 188 288 372 1131 791 831
Total water sold 1430 1831 2010 1352 1633 1903 951 89% 95%
Water production 1505 1928 2115 1423 1719 2003 95% 89% 951
NANAGENENT
Days accounts receivable 37 37 37 40 43 42 108% 116% 114%
Number of employees 830 830 830 1067 1194 1194 1291 144% 1441
X increase ofemployees 15.3% 0.0% 0.01 10.7% 11.9% 0.0% -- - --
Euployee increase ince '85 15.31 15.31 15.31 48.2% 65.8% 65.8% 3151 430% 430%
Personnel cost (X of total) 13% 11 101 161 18% 18X 123X 1641 1801
FINANCIAL
Average Mater charges (N/cu a)
Rau Mater 41.85 39.94 42.51 40.39 40.56 39.54 971 1021 931
Treated water 96.42 92.47 98.44 87.53 83.63 81.87 91% 90% 831
Total average 48.0 50.40 55.00 46.90 48.20 48.60 981 96% 881
Increase intotal average 13.31 5.01 9.0X 7.11 2.61 1.01 541 52% 11l
Working ratio 63.9% 61.81 59.4% 77.1% 76.4% 70.0% 120% 1241 1181
Rate of return 5.01 5.01 5.01 2.11 1.31 2.11 421 261 421
Debt service ratio 3.8 1.8 2.2 1.2 0.6 0.6 321 33% 271
Debt on debt plus equity 181 161 13% 24% 151 81 133% 941 621
1/ Forecasts are taken from Staff Appraisal Report, Annex 5, Table 7.
2/ Actuals are taken from a completion report on the Namgang component of the
projest provided to the Bank in July 1991 by KOWACO and its consultants.
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4. Project Imlgelntation
Ilonitorina Indicators (Continued)
B. TAE6U WATER SYSTE19 COMNENT
I/ 21
Indicator Schedule Actual I of Appraisal Estimate
1989 1999 1990 1968 1989 1990 1988 1989 1990
DEMAND
Population (000) 2342 2428 2514 2239 2289 2229 961 941 891
Population served (000) 2237 2353 2451 2149 2212 2165 961 941 881
X Population served 95.5X 97.01 97.51 961 961 971 -- - -
Water sold (oil. cu e) 159.2 174.4 188.7 170 193 218 1071 1111 1161
Water Production ( il. cu a) 238 256 274 245.5 271.6 312.0 1031 1061 1141
MANAGENENT
Days accounts receivable 6 6 7 37 37 35 616% 6161 5001
Number of esployees 869 873 950 849 840 850 981 961 891
X increase inemployees 41 11 91 71 -1I 1 -- -- --
X eaployee increase ince '85 61 71 161 41 21 41 -- -- --
eeployees per 1000 connections 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.0 94% 911 861
FINANCIAL
Avg. water charges (I/cu a) 234.1 244.6 245.7 203.8 199.0 202.6 a71 911 821
Avg. water charge increase 6.71 4.51 0.51 0.71 -2.41 1.1 -- -
Working ratio 501 491 501 571 59 611 -- -- --
Contribution to i vestient 411 651 1331 -1431 -491 201 -- --
Rate of return 8.41 8.01 8.01 5.9X 5.41 4.01 701 681 501
Debt servic ratio 1.6 1.4 2.1 0.4 0.8 1.1 -- -- -
Debt on debt plus equity 351 301 271 411 391 261 - -- -
1/ Forecasts are taken from Staff Appraisal Report, Annex 10, Table 5.
2/ Actuals are taken from material on performance of the Taegu Water Bureau
provided to the Bank in August 1991.
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5. ProJect Cosit. and Financina
a) ProJect Cotls
(million won)
Appraisal Estimate Actual Costs
* roict Comoonent Local Foreign Total, Local Foteign Total
A. Nauana Reqional Systes 5/
Civil Works 8,968 3,770 12,738 12,080 0 12,090
Materials & Equipment 4,382 10,053 14,435 8,820 2,345 11,165
Engineering & technical
assistance 30 1.175 4 891
14,280 14,069 28,348 21,747 2,389 24,136
Land acquisition 653 0 653 1,723 0 1,783
Taxes/duties/other 3.386 0 3.396 1.47_ 0 1.472
Total Namgang System 18,319 149068 32,387 24,942 2,389 27,331
B. Taeou Vater System
Civil works 19,649 9,894 28,543 23,212 0 23,212
Materials & equipment 4,986 12,240 17,226 10,274 1,620 11,894
Engineering & technical ;
assistance 816 457 1.273 440 0 440
25,451 21,591 47,042 33,926 1,620 35,546
Land acquisition 898 0 898 1,330 0 1,330
Taxes/duties/other 4.406 0 4.406 2.199 0 2.198
Total Tae;u Systes 30,755 21,591 52,346 37,454 1io20 39,074
C. TOTALS 
Civil uorks 28,617 12,664 41,291 35,292 0 35,292
Materials I equipment 9,368 22,293 31,661 19,094 3,965 23,059
Engineering & technical
assistance 1 746 702 2.440 1.287 44 1.331
39,731 35,659 75,390 55,A73 4,009 59,682
Land acquisition 1,550 0 1,550 3,053 0 3,053
Taxes/duties/other 7.793 0 7.793 3.670 0 3 670
TOTAL PROJECT 49,074 35,659 84,733 62,396 4,009 66,9405
C3 = -zS c ::gg-gS == m:z:: =:g::_=
L/ Appraisal estimaten are recalculated fromappraisal data to incorporate physical nd price contingencies in the
individual cost items using the appraisal assueptions, i cluding the appraisal exchange rate of US$ = 816.
21 Actual costs for the Namgang component have been compiled from data in the consultant's 'Project Completion
Report for Construction' (Dteaber 1989), an auditor's 'Report onStatement of Cash Receipts and Expenditures
for the Period From January 1,1985 to December 31, 1988', and the Bank's disbursement r cords.
3/ Actual costs for the Taegu cooponent have been compiled from data in the 'Construction Supervision C mpletion
Report' (1989) prepared bythe consultants, and in a table, 'Project Implementation and Cost Revision',
included as Annex 4 in a Bank Supervision Report dated June 13, 1989.
y/ Excnange rates used in converting vonto USt are the market rates on the date of the transaction, f known, or
the average market rate during the quarter ofthe transaction (INF inancial Statistics, rf market rates).
51 Foreign costs in appraisal estimates include irect and indirect osts. Actual foreign costs are only for
direct imports; indirect foreign costs are included under local costs.
I j -1 ,.,I, 1
I.:
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5. Project Costs and Financing
a) Proijct Costs (Continued)
(million US$)
Aegraisal Estioate Actual Costs
Project Comoonent Local Foreign Total Local Foreion Total
A. Namiana Regional System 5/ 5.
Civil Vorks 10.99 4.62 15.61 15025 0 15.25
Materials * Equipment 5.37 12.32 17.69 11.55 3.06 14.61
Engineering S technical
assistance 1.14 0.30 1.44 1.10 0.07 1.17
17.50 17.24 34.74 27.90 3.13 31.03
Land acquisition 0.80 0 0.80 2.15 0 2.15
Taxes/duties/other 4.15 0 4.15 2.00 0 2.00
Total Namqang System 82.45 17.24 39.69 32.05 3.13 35.18
B. Taegu Water System
Civil works 24.08 10.90 34.98 29.27 0 29.27
Materials & equipment 6.11 15.00 21.11 12.70 2.20 14.90
Engineering & technical
assistance 1.00 0.56 1.56 0.58 0 0.59
31.19 86.46 57.65 42.55 2.20 44.75
Land acquisition 1.10 0 1.10 1.60 0 1.60
Taxes/dutiss/other 5.40 0 5.40 2.75 0 2.75
Total Taegu System 37.69 26.46 64.15 46.90 2.20 49.10
C. TOTALS A
Civil works 35.07 15.52 50.59 44.52 0 44.52
Materials & equipment 11.49 27.32 38.90 24.25 5.26 29.51
Engineering & technical
assistsnce 2.14 0.86 3.00 1.68 0.07 1.75
48.69 43.70 92.39 70.45 5.33 75.78
Land acquisition 1.90 0 1.90 3.75 0 3.75
Taxes/duties/other 9.55 0 9.55 4.75 0 4.75
TOTAL PROJECT 60.14 43.70 103.84 78.95 5.33 84.28
:ug= gazg:: =:=C:== 33=323 :32:3=2 :2::=:
L/ Appraisal estimates are recalculated fromappraisal data to incorporate physical nd price contingencies in the
individual cost items using the appraisal assumptions, including the appraisal exchange rate of USS -W 816.
2/ Actual costs for the Naogang component have been compiled from data in the consultant's 'Project Completion
Report for Construction' (December 1999), an auditor's 'Report onStatement of Cash Receipts and Expenditures
for the Period From January 1,1985 to December 31, 1988', and the Bank's disbursement records.
3/ Actual costs for the Taegu component have been compiled from data in the 'Construction Supervision C mpletion
Report' (1989) prepared bythe consultants, and in a table, 'Project Implepentation and Cost Revision',
included asAnnex 4in a Dank Supervision Report dated June 13, 1989.
4/ Exchange rates used in converting wonto US. are the market rates on the date of the transaction, if known, or
the average market rate during the quarter ofthe transaction (IMF inancial Statistics, rf market rates).
5/ Foreign costs in appraisal estioates include irect and indirect osts. Actual foreign costs are only for
direct imports; indirect foreign costs are included under local costs.
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5. Project Costs and Financina
b) Project Financing
USS (millions) Won (millions)
A4oraisal Actual Appraisal Actual
Aeount I Asount % Asount X Amount X
NANGANG COMPONENT
1'
Total Project Cost 39.50 100% 35.18 100% 32,387 100% 27,331 100%
Project Financing
Bank Loan 15.00 38% 14.69 42% 12,130 30% 10,679 39%
Local sources 24.50 62% 20.50 58% 20,257 62% 16,653 61%
Total financing 39.50 100% 35.18 100% 32,387 100% 27,331 100%
TAEGU CONPONENT
Total Project Cost 64.20 100% 49.10 100% 52,265 too, 38,090 100%
Project Financing
Bank Loan 23.00 36% 19.33 39% 18,463 35% 14,570 38%
Local sources 41.20 64% 29.77 61% 33,792 65% 23,510 62%
Total financing 64.20 100% 49.10 100% 52,265 100% 38,080 100I
1/ The total costs do not include interest during construction.
2/ Local financing for the Maagang component came ntirely asequity contributions by the 6overnuent, as planned
at the time of appraisal.
3I Local financing for the Taegu cosponent came from the following various sources, asexpected atappraisal:
Taegu City bonds; internal cash generation by the Taegu Water Bureau; and government loans. Actual
contributions t Nard the project ost from each of these sources i not possible b cause these sources are
pooled and used for various purposes bythe Water Bureau.
- 31 -
&. ProJEct Rults
a) Dir=t EdfIt.
Actual or Estimate at
1/ Project 2/ Full 3/
Appraisal Completion Development
Estimate (1990) (1995)
Population with Improved Water Service 140,000 140,000 140,000
Additional Communities Proved With
Public Water Service 9 9 9
Additional Population Served 91,000 91,000 175,000
Population Served by House Connections 75% 75% 85%
1/ As given in the Appraisal Report for 1989, the first year of full project
operation.
2/ Estimate for 1990, first year project actually in full operation.
3/ Estimate for 1995, last full operating year before additional works in
operation.
TAE ..U
Actual or Estimate at
Project 4/ Project 5/ Full
Appraisal Completion Development
Estimate (1990) (1995)
Additional Population Served 215,000 154,000 780,000
Total Population Served 2,353,000 2,212,000 3,100,000
Population Served (X) 97% 96% 98%
Non-revenue Water 32% 29% --
4/ As given in the Appraisal Report for 1989, the first year of full project
operation.
5/ Actual for 1989, the first full year of full project operation.
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6. projuct Results
b) EconoDmic -iact
NA*S c arENT
Actual
AQppraisal Estimate (At Final Development)
Economic Rate
of Return 13X not available
Incremental Financial
Rate of Return 1.5X 2.2%
Underlying Assumptions:
For a2oraisal estimate: The economic rate of return (ERR) for the Namgang
component was based on existing retail water tariffs and the water benefits,
including increased values of benefitting properties, and the capital and
operating costs for the entire network of municipalities and small communities
served by the project in the Namgang system.
The estimate of the incremental financial rate of return (IFRR), however, was
based on existing ISWACO tariffs for bulk treated water, which were the same
nation-wide regardless of the actual costs in each system operated by ISWACO, and
the capital and operating costs of ISWACO's bulk treated water system at Namgang.
This gives an apparent low rate of return for Namgang where the cost of water is
above the average cost.
For the Project Completion Report: The actual ERR for the completed project can
not be calculated because the Bank has insufficient data on the actual retail
tariffs and costs of distribution in the served communities, or on any increases
in values of benefiting properties.
The actual IFRR for the completed proJect has been recalculated, at constant 1990
prices, to be about 2%, substantially the same as was predicted, using available
(but somewhat uncertain) data. The assumptions include that bulk treated water
tariffs will be increased about 13.5% in 1992, and about 7X per year in 1993-
1995, which has been reported to the Bank as the Government's intention (Part II,
para. 2.6). Should those increases not take place, the IFRR would be about 0.8X.
If tariffs are increased as expected but operating and maintenance expenses were
to increase by about 30% in real terms, then the IFRR would be negative.
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6. Proiect Results
b) Economic Impact (Continued)
TAEGU COMfINENT
Actual
Appraisal Estimate (At Final Development)
Economic Rate
of Return 17.8% 16%
Underlying Assumptioni:
For appraisal estimate: Calculation of the economic rate of return (ERR) for the
Taegu component was based on existing tariffs and a small increase (5%. in real
terms) required to comply with a financial covenant after 1985. Since tariffs
were well above the marginal costs, the Incremental financial rate of return
(iFRR) was taken as a proxy for the ERR of *he Taegu component. The capital
costs included complementary distribution and leak detection works, all at 1985
prices. Revenues included user contributions. The incremental operating costs
were estimated at 65 w/cu m until 1983, and 80 w/cu m thereafter.
For the Project Completion Report: The actual IFRR has been calculated using the
same procedures used for the appraisal estimate, except that all costs and
benefits are at 1990 prices rather than 1985 prices. Since there is no reliable
data on the costs of complimentary works, the appraisal estimates, converted to
1990 prices have been used.
Increases in actual water sales over 1988 sales have been assumed to equal the
incremental water sales for 1989 and 1990. Thereafter, incremental water sales
each year have been assumed about the same as the appraisal forecasts. The
average water tariffs for 1989, 1990 and 1991 and the incremental operating and
maintenance costs for the project for 1989 and 1990 are those reported in project
monitoring indicators provided by the Taegu authorities but converted to 1990
prices. The 1990 incremental operating and maintenance costs and the 1991
average tariff, at 1990 prices, have been used throughout the balance of the
projection period. Since data on actual incremental user contributions is
lacking, they have been omitted from the calculations. This and the fact that
tariff increases required to meet the financial covenant have not been made may
account for the small reduction in the actual IFRR compared to the appraisal
forecasts, in spite of the substantial reduction in actual project costs.
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6. Project Results
C) Financial Iioact
NAM6ANG COIPONENTs (KOWACO PERATIONS)
1/'
Appraisal
Estimate 2/ 3/
(1990) Actual
Raw Water Sold (million cu m) 1,561 1,531
Treated Water Sold (million cu m) 449 372
Raw Water Tariff (W per cu m) 43 39.54
Treated Water Tariff (W per cu m) 98 81.87
Total Operating Revenues (million W) 110,518 (1989) 80,366
Operational Expenses (million W) 65,678 (1989) 62,048
Depreciation (million W) 17,866 (1989) 14,272
Net Operating Income (million W) 14,472 (1989) 4,046
Working Ratio (%) 59.4% 70.0%
Rate of Return on Revalued Assets (%) 5.0% 2.1%
Debt Service Coverage (times) 2.2 0.6
% Debt on Debt plus Equity 13% 8%
TAEGU WATER SUPPLY BUREAU
I/
Appraisal 4/
Estimate Actual
(1990) (1990)
Water Sold (million cu m) 188.7 218
Average Water Tariff (W per cu m) 245.7 202.5
Total Operating Revenues (million W) 53,997 50,7B7
Operational Expenses (million W) 26,729 32,340
Depreciation (million W) 8,356 8,723
Net Operating Income (million W) 14,478 9,724
Working Capital (%) 49.5% 60.7%
Rate of Return on Revalued Assets (%) 8.0% 4.0%
Debt Service Ratio (times) 2.1 1.13
% Debt on Debt Plus Equity 27% 26.2%
1/ Last year of appraisal forecasts: 1990.
2/ For 1990 except as noted.
3/ Data from "Monitoring Indicators" provided to Bank in July 1991, and fi-om
Engineering Consultant's "Project Completion Report for Construction
Supervision" (December 1989).
4/ Data from "Monitoring Indicators" provided to Bank in August 1991, and
from audit report for period January 1 - December 31, 1990.
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7. Status of Major Covenants
Covenant Subject Compliance/Comments
Loan Agreement
Whereas(C) Upon completion of Part A, Final Transfer Agreement between
Borrower to transfer facilities MOC and KOWACO (which relaced
to ISWACO for operation and ISWACO) executed on 12/31/89.
maintenance.
2.02 (b) Borrower to open Special Opening of Special Account for
Account for Part A of Project. Part A, Namgang component,
delayed until late in 1987 and
was used sparingly.
2.02 (c) Borrower to open Special Special Account for Part B, Taegu
Account for Part B of Project. component, was opened soon after
loan effectiveness and fully
utilized during construction.
3.01 (b) For Part B, Borrower to relend Subsidiary Loan Agreement is
US$23.Om to Taegu under a dated October 30, 1985.
subsidiary loan agreement.
3.03 Borrower to maintain a project Satisfactory compliance.
unit within MOC for
implementing Part A.
3.05 For operation and maintenance Satisfactory compliance,
of Part A, Borrower, prior to although, because implementation
project completion, to enter of Part A was delayed, draft
into a Transfer and Operations agreement was not furnished to
Agreement with ISWACO. Draft Bank until Aprii 1989, about the
of Agreement to be submitted time the Part A facilities were
to Bank by 12/31/87 for transferred.
comment.
3.06 Borrower to cause NRS munici- Mixed performance. Comprehensive
palities, to carry out, under improvement plan not provided to
the coordination of MOC and Bank. Distribution improvements
MOHA, water distribution for two major municipalities
system improvements by using 75% of water were completed
12/31/88 under a plan satis- before water from project was
factory to Bank. available, however. But distri-
for most smaller communities was
not completed until well after
water was available.
3.07 To provide adequate water to Unsatisfactory compliance. Only
NRS municipalities, Borrower vague acquisition programs were
to complete program of land presented to Bank periodically.
acquisition according to By early 1991, only about 33X.
schedule satisfactory to Bank. of the acquisition was completed.
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7. Status of Major Covenants (Continued)
Covenant Subject Compliance/Comments
Loan Agreement
(Continued)
3.08 Borrower to cause MOHA to re- Unsatisfactory compliance. No
view organization of water and formal study report was presented.
sewerage services in Taegu and, to Bank, although the matter
by 12/31/86, submit results of was discussed with Bank missions.
review to Bank for comment. In 1987 MOHA decided to combine
water and sewerage services in
several cities, including Taegu,
but results were unsatisfactory.
4.01 (a) Borrower to maintain, and cause Satisfactory compliance.
Taegu to maintain, adequate
accounts in respect of the
project;
(b) have the accounts, including the
MOC and Taequ Special Accounts,
audited by independent auditors;
(c) furnish certified copies of audit
reports to Bank within six months
of each fiscal year.
4.02 Borrower to cause Taegu to take Unsatisfactory compliance. The
steps necessary to set and ROR was achieved in 1986 but
maintain tariffs, etc, as neces- began to decline in 1987, reach-
sary to produce an annual ROR on ing 5% in 1989 and probably lower
TWB's net fixed assets in oper- in 1990, because of continued
ation not less than 8%. Government freeze on utility
charges.
5.01 (c) Any amendment, suspension, Satisfactory compliance.
repeal, etc., of the Industrial Changes in law under which
Sites and Water Resources Law, KOWACO assumed responsibilities
which would adversely affect of ISWACO relative to this
ISWACO ability to perform its project did not adversely effect
obligations under the Project the implementation and operation
Agreement would be cause for of the project.
suspension of disbursements.
Sch. I No loan withdrawals for civil Satisfactory compliance.
works or equipment and materials Although engagement of consult-
for Part A to be made until ants was late, and there was
consultints are engaged for further delay in notifying the
construction supervision of Bank, withdrawals from the loan
Part A. for these goods and services
were not required during the
period of delay, however.
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7. Status of Major Covenants (Continued)
Covenant Subject Compliance/Comments
Project Agreement
2.02 For purpose of operating and Under draft transfer agreement
maintaining Part A, ISWACO, dated April 8, 1989, NRS facil-
prior to project completion, ities transfered to KOWACO in
to enter into a Transfer and May 1989. Final transfer agree-
Operations Agreement, ment, satisfactory to Bank, was
satisfactory to the Bank. executed on 12/31/89.
2.05 In consultation with Bank, Study completed late in 1986.
ISWACO to carry out country-
wide study of bulk water tariff
policy for raw and treated
water, including for NRS water
charges, and submit study to
Bank by 06/30/86 for review and
comment.
4.01 ISWACO to maintain adequate Satisfactory compliance.
records to reflect its
operations and financial
condition.
4.02 (a) ISWACO to have its accounts and Satisfactory compliance.
financial statements for each
year audited by independent
auditors; and
(b) certified copies of financial Satisfactory compliance.
statements and audit reports to
be furnished to Bank within six
months of fiscal year end.
4.04 ISWACO to set and maintain the Unsatisfactory compliance. In
tariffs and other charges of its 1988, partially due to drought,
Water and Dams Divisions as ROR for Dams Division, fell to
necessary to produce a ROR on net 2.5'h in 1988 and 4.0% in 1999.
fixed assets in operation for ROR for Water Division was
each division not less than 5%. 2.1% or lower for 1988 through
1990.
4.05 ISWACO to maintain a debt service Unsatisfactory compliance.
ratio not less than 1.3.
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7. Status of MaJor Covenants (Continued)
Covenant Subject Comoliance/Comments
Project Agreement
(Continued)
4.06 ISWACO to furnish to Bank by Satisfactory compliance. ISWACO
August 31 each year five-year (KOWACO) staff provide comp,-ter
financial projections for its projections using computer model
Water and Dams Divisions. provided by the Bank.
4.07 ISWACO to furnish to Bank by Generally satisfactory
August 31 and February 28 each compliance, although indicators
year, financial monitoring provided were not all those
indicators for its Water and desired by the Bank.
Dams Divisions.
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6. Use of Bank Resources
a) Dank Staff/Consultant Inauts
(Staff Weeks)
Stage of
Project Cvcle Bank Fiscal Year
FY65 FY86 FY87 FY98 FY89 FY90 FY91 TOTALS
Preappraisal 22.9 22.9
Appraisal 20.5 20.5
Negs/Admin. 3.8 6.3 10.1
Supervision 9.2 5.6 7.9 4.4 1.9 0.2 28.2
PCR Prep. 5.3 5.3
Other 1.5 0.3 1.8
TOTALS 47.2 16.0 5.9 7.9 4.4 1.9 5.5 88.8
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8. Use of Bank Resources
1/
b) Bank hissions
2/
Type of Perform. Problem
Mission Dates Staff Ratings Types
Identify 11/1-16/84 Fin. Analyst -- --
Engineer
Preappraise 2/11-27/85 Fin. Analyst
Engineers (2)
Appraise 4/8-26/85 Fin. Analyst
Engineer
SPN * 1 2/24-3/15/85 Fin. Analyst 1
Engineers (2)
SPN 4 2 6/18-20/86 Engineers (2) 1 Proj. management
SPN * 3 3/16-18/87 Fin. Analyst 2 Proj. management
Engineer
SPN 4 4 1/4-2/9/88 Fin. Analyst I --
Engineer
SPN # 5 7/11-16/88 Fin. Analyst 1 --
SPN * 6 4/30-5/9/89 Fin. Analyst 1 --
Engineer
SPN # 7 3/26-4/5/90 Engineer 2 Financial
Performance
1/ List of missions does not include brief visits by Bank staff with multiple
objectives such as by disbursement officer in July 1986, and by a financial
analyst August 1987. In additan to Dank staff, local consultants, not listed
above, were engaged on occassion to assist with data collection.
g/ Performance Ratings:
1. a Problem Free or Minor Problems
2. = Moderate Problems
3. a "ajor Problems
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Annex 1
DescriDtion of the ProJect
The objectives of the project are to: (a) provide adequate and reliable
water supply to the municipalities in the NRS situated inma water scarce area of
the country and thus promote their planned social and industrial development; (b)
increase water supply coverage in Taegu and ensure adequate water services to the
low-income urban population; (c) carry out a review of the organization of water
and sewerage services in Taegu; and (d) extend the scope of ISWACO's national
bulk water policy study to include the NRS.
The project consists of the following parts, subject to such modifications
thereof as the Borrower and the Bank may agree upon from time to time to achieve
such objectives:
Part A: NRS:
(i) provision of water intake, and raw water pumping station from the existing
Namgang Reservoir, a raw water transmission pipelinp to Sacheon, and a new
water treatment plant with an initial capacity of 75,000 tpd;
(ii) installation of a main treated water pumping station at Sacheon, and two
transmission pipelines;
(iii) provision of consultant's services for construction supervision: and
(iv) undertaking studies for national bulk water pricing policies and their
application to NRS.
Part B: TWS2:
Ci) expansion of the existing water intake pumping station from the Nakdong
River and the existing Dasa treatment plant;
(ii) provision of additional transmission and distribution facilities to use
this capacity and distribute to all areas of the city;
(iii) provision of additional booster pumping stations and service reservoirs,
replacement of old and leaking distribution pipes and the improvement of
instrumentation and control of the whole system;
{iv) provision of consultitag services for construction supervision; and
(v) review of the organization of water and sewerage services in Taegu.
The project is expected to be completed by December 31, 1988.
1/ From Schedule 2 of the Loan Agreement dated September 23, 1985.
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